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11Introduction
12EU free trade agreements establish common bodies that are entrusted with certain tasks
13and that therefore have specific decision-making powers. The free trade agreements
14include them so as to facilitate their own amendment and implementation. One well-
15known treaty organ is the Association Council instituted by the EU Association
16Agreement with Turkey, whose decisions provide the legal bases for the labour market
17access of Turkish nationals in the EU. These decisions have binding effect,1 and are
18based on an explicit mandate included in the Additional Protocol of 19702 which is
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1ECJ 10 September 1996, Taflan-Met and Others ECLI:EU:C:1996:315, paras. 18-21.
2Art. 36 ff Additional Protocol, annexed to the Agreement establishing the Association between
the European Economic Community and Turkey, OJ 1977 L 361/59. Art. 36 reads: ‘Freedom of
movement for workers between Member States of the Community and Turkey shall be secured by
progressive stages in accordance with the principles set out in Article 12 of the Agreement of
Association between the end of the twelfth and the twenty-second year after the entry into force of
that Agreement. The Council of Association shall decide on the rules necessary to that end’. Art. 12
of the Association Agreement, OJ 1977 L 361/1, states that ‘the Contracting parties agree to be
guided by Articles 48, 49 and 50 of the [ECT] for the purpose of progressively securing freedom of
movement for workers between them’.
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19quite specific with regard both to its objective and the extent of the Council’s
20competences. The more recent free trade agreements concluded by the EU provide for
21similar treaty bodies, increasingly with more extensive competences. One can observe a
22trend of EU free trade agreements making use of such bodies more and more
23frequently, reflecting the international move towards delegation of authority to
24international actors.3 A trade committee has been set up by the free trade agreements
25with Korea;4 its binding decisions relate to customs duties5 but also to treaty
26amendments and authoritative interpretations.6 The next, and so far highest, level has
27been reached in the free trade agreement with Canada (CETA) which provides for a
28joint CETA committee and a range of specialised committees (Articles 26.1 and 26.2).
29CETA entrusts these bodies, in particular the joint committee, with many functions.
30As will be shown below, the bodies are authorised to make binding decisions on very
31diverse, even rather fundamental, issues of varying significance.
32The extent and proliferation of these competences is a threat to democracy, as they
33have the capacity of allowing decisions to be made and hence public powers exercised
34that had formerly been subject to the decision-making procedures of national or EU
35Parliaments (e.g. procedural rules or common standards). The committees do so
36without parliamentary control even though they sometimes exercise political discretion.
37The binding force of their decisions is, by and large, not subject to the completion of the
38usual domestic constitutional procedures relevant for entering into international
39obligations. The provisions in CETA, for example, are highly imprecise. According to
40Article 26.3.2, decisions by the CETA joint committee are binding on parties subject to
41the ‘completion of any necessary internal requirements’. Article 30.2.2 CETA explicitly
42provides that a decision taken by the CETA joint committee to amend protocols and
43annexes may be approved by the parties in accordance with their ‘respective internal
44requirements and procedures necessary for the entry into force of the amendments’.7
45The latter formulation could be read to imply a ratification requirement as it speaks of
46‘entry into force’; parliaments could have a say. Alternatively, the simplified procedure
47of Article 218(9) TFEU might apply meaning that there would be no ratification
48requirement, no parliamentary participation implied.8 Thus, generally speaking,
3C. Bradley and J. Kelly, ‘The concept of international delegation’, 71(1) Law and Contemporary
Problems (2008) p. 1.
4Art. 15.4 EU Korea Free Trade Agreement, OJ 2011 L 127, 6.
5Art. 2.5.4 EU Korea Free Trade Agreement.
6Art. 15.5.2 EU Korea Free Trade Agreement regarding Annexes, Protocols and Notes; Art.
15.1.4 d) on binding interpretations.
7Similarly, Art. 5.14.2(d) CETA with regard to the joint management committee decision to
amend the annexes to Chapter 5.
8See German Federal Constitutional Court 13 October 2016, Case 2 BvR 1368/16, Huber v
German Federal Government para. 64, available at <www.bverfg.de/e/rs20161013_2bvr136816.
html>, visited 8 July 2018.
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49parliaments do not need to be involved for decisions taken by treaty bodies to become
50binding on parties, as they are neither represented in the bodies nor participate in their
51internal procedures.9 This raises the question of whether public powers can legally and
52legitimately be transferred to the committees.
53The present contribution first gives an overview of the diversity of the free trade
54agreements treaty bodies’ competences and the legal relevance of their acts – not only
55under international law - taking CETA as a specific example since the position of the
56committees is the most elaborate there. It will be shown that these committees do
57autonomously exercise public power – apart from the few instances in which
58subsequent ratification or adoption of their decisions by the parties is explicitly
59provided for. Next, the democratic concerns alluded to above will be addressed.
60In this respect, one must analyse the competence of the EU to transfer powers to
61treaty bodies and explore the constitutional limits resulting from requirements of
62democratic legitimacy and institutional balance. Finally, recommendations will be
63presented on how to increase parliamentary control over rule-making treaty bodies
64and, accordingly, expand the European Parliament’s role in this respect.
65Binding competences of CETA committees: exercise of
66public powers
67Different kinds of power
68CETA sets up an extensive institutional architecture consisting of a CETA joint
69committee (Article 26.1) and a number of specialised committees (Article 26.2.1)
70which submit proposals to the CETA joint committee or take binding decisions
71themselves.
72As already mentioned, the decision-making powers of these committees
73comprise diverse types of authority. In the typology of international delegation
74developed by Bradley and Kelly,10 the committees are in the first place competent
75to exercise legislative powers as they may amend CETA11 or issue general rules.12
9See also A. Alemanno, ‘The Regulatory Cooperation Chapter of the Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership: Institutional Structures and Democratic Consequences’, 18(3) Journal of
International Economic Law (2015) p. 625 at p. 635 ff.
10Bradley and Kelly, supra n. 3, p. 10-17.
11The CETA joint committee may decide on the extension of the concept of intellectual property
(Art. 8.1), or on the meaning of fair and equitable treatment of investors (Art. 8.10.3). It may amend
or supplement CETA provisions with respect to the Harmonized System (Art. 2.13.1(b)), and
consider amendments to Chapter 4 of the CETA (Art. 4.7.1(f) read in conjunction with Art. 26.1.5(c))
or make amendments to Chapter 23 (Art. 23.11.5).
12Under Art. 8.28.3 read in conjunction with Art. 8.28.7 CETA, the CETA joint committee sets
out administrative and organisational aspects of the functioning of the Appellate Tribunal, including
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76An amendment in this sense may also reflect the CETA joint committee’s power
77to change the institutional architecture of CETA, as it is competent to dissolve
78special committees or to establish new special committees which may alter
79or take over the powers of the special committees already provided in CETA
80(Article 26.1.5(a), (g) and (h) CETA); it may also establish ad hoc working groups
81according to Article 4.7.2. Second, the committees are mandated to adopt
82regulatory decisions, as they may create technical-administrative rules for
83implementing CETA,13 or interpret CETA obligations with binding force
84(Articles 8.31.3, 8.44.3(a), 26.1.5(e) CETA). The CETA committees can decide
85on the applicability of exceptions14 and determine and establish mechanisms for
86the simplified negotiation of mutual recognition agreements.15 The modification
87of annexes to CETA is one of the types of regulatory authority.16 Some of the
88regulatory powers may have particularly far-reaching significance, such as deciding
89on the details for the mutual exchange of product warnings17 which may include
90rules on the protection of personal data and the protection of confidential business
91data. The latter competence may enable the relevant committee to set common
92standards for implementation measures, which implies the exercise of (quasi)
93legislative authority. Third, the committees have adjudicative functions.18
procedural issues. By virtue of Arts. 8.44.2 and 8.44.3(b), the Committee on Services and
Investment establishes a code of conduct for the tribunal members that may address issues of
disclosure, confidentiality, impartiality and independence, and procedural and transparency rules.
The parties’ role as such is to complete their respective internal requirements and procedures.
13For example, the joint CETA committee may change the number of investment tribunal
members (Art. 8.27.3), settle their salary (Art. 8.27.15), decide the list of arbitrators (Art. 29.8), or
remove a member from the tribunal (Art. 8.30.4). Art. 10.5.2(b) grants the competence to exchange
and adopt common criteria and interpretations for the implementation of Chapter 10 on temporary
entry and residence for business purposes to the contact points of both sides, i.e. the Canadian
Immigration Director and the EU Director General for Trade.
14See the competences of the financial services committee in Annex 13-B CETA.
15Art. 11.3 CETA on mutual recognition of professional qualifications. Those agreements are
negotiated in a specific procedure provided in Art. 11.3.3–11.3.6 CETA and finally adopted by
decision of the MRA Committee, whose binding force is conditional upon subsequent notification
to the MRA Committee by each Party of the fulfilment of its respective internal requirements. The
negotiations are conducted by each Party.
16Under Art. 20.22.1, read in conjunction with Article 26.1.5(c), the CETA joint committee
may, by amending Annex 20-A, add or remove protected geographical indications of origin. The
joint management committee shall amend the Annexes to Chapter 5 (Art. 5.14.2(d)) (explicitly
subject to approval by the parties in accordance with their procedures necessary for the entry into
force of the amendment). See also Art. 20.22.1 in combination with Art. 26.1.5(c) CETA. For this
classification see Bradley and Kelly, supra n. 3, p. 10.
17The Committee on Trade in Goods endorses the implementation measures, Art. 21.7.5 CETA.
18Under Art. 6.14.4, in conjunction with Art. 2.8.4 CETA, the joint Customs Cooperation
Committee can resolve customs issues raised by a Party.
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94There are further competences of the committees that cannot be easily
95classified, as they cover fundamental aspects such as the replacement of the
96investment dispute system by a multilateral mechanism and the related
97transitional arrangements (Article 8.29 CETA).
98Overall, this overview illustrates that the powers go beyond the mere executive
99implementation of obligations already enshrined in the agreement; they include
100decision-making on fundamental issues and even rule-making by generating
101norms and treaty amendments. Bearing this diversity in mind is important because
102the legitimacy requirements, in particular the degree of precision of the mandate
103and the parliamentary involvement required, differ according to the type and
104significance of the committees’ powers. We will return to this.
105Decision-making of committees and their binding force
106The CETA joint committee, as well as the specialised committees, must decide
107unanimously (Article 13.18.2, Article 26.3.3). The committees consist of
108representatives of Canada and the EU, usually the Commissioner responsible for
109trade (Article 26.1.1 CETA). The presence of representatives of the EU Member
110States is provided for only in some specialised committees.19 Consequently, the
111committees are not actors independent from the parties’ will. They are, however,
112autonomous; they do not comprise all parties and their decisions are binding on
113the parties.
114The binding force of decisions can be inferred from several circumstances. First,
115CETAdistinguishes between decisions and recommendations (see e.g. Articles 26.1.4(e),
11626.1.5(f) and 26.3.2). Second, any decision adopted by a committee will cease to be
117effective if the provisional application of CETA is terminated (Article 30.7.3(d))
118– such a rule would be futile if the decision was a mere recommendation. Third,
119both Article 26.3.2 on the CETA joint committee and Article 26.2.4 on the
120specialised committees explicitly address the general binding effect of their
121decisions, as shown more explicitly below. Thus, in the vast majority of cases a
122decision of the CETA joint committee or of any of the specialised committees is
123binding on the EU and its Member States without further adoption or even
19Art. 5.14.1: regulatory and trade representatives that bear responsibility for sanitary and
phytosanitary measures; Art. 6.14.2: representatives of customs, commercial or other competent
authorities; Art. 13.18.1: representatives of financial services authorities; Art. 19.19.1 makes a
general reference to representatives of the contracting parties; Art. 21.6.3: the Forum for Regulatory
Cooperation is jointly chaired by senior representatives of Canada and the Commission, while the
other members can be ‘relevant officials of each Party’ which might include national representatives
of the EU Member States.
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124ratification. This is envisaged in other EU treaties as well; it is not a peculiarity of
125CETA.20 An analysis of the co-operation rules in EU agreements shows
126that ‘decision’ is by far the most frequently used term to designate binding
127legal instruments; this corresponds to general practice under public international
128law.21
129Article 26.3.2, the general rule on the binding force of decisions of the CETA
130joint committee (see Article 26.1.4(e)), establishes the binding effect of its
131decisions and the obligation of the parties to implement them. However, in
132parenthesis, it contains the reservation of ‘the completion of any necessary internal
133requirements and procedures’. This formulation does not impose a ratification
134requirement on the parties and CETA does not define the internal procedures,
135which are governed by the internal law of the parties. The parties themselves must
136determine which procedures are relevant according to their national (in particular
137constitutional) rules on how international obligations become binding upon them.
138For the EU, the internal procedures for entering into international
139commitments are spelled out in Article 218 TFEU. There is a normal procedure
140by which the Council decides, acting on a Commission proposal, on the
141conclusion of international treaties with involvement or even consent of the
142European Parliament according to Article 218(6). Article 218 TFEU also
143establishes specific, simplified procedures for agreeing to international rules in its
144paragraphs 7 and 9. Article 218(9) TFEU provides, inter alia, that the Council,
145again acting on a Commission proposal, adopts the position to be taken by the EU
146in a treaty body. In the case of simplified amendments to be adopted by a
147committee, Article 218(7) TFEU establishes an even more simplified procedure22
148whereby an amendment is agreed to by a negotiator (usually the Commission)
149which has been authorised to do so by the Council. Both rules constitute a
150derogation from the EU’s regular procedures. That the simplified procedure of
151Article 218(7) applies to the adoption of the CETA joint committee decision
152under Article 20.22 CETA to amend Annex 20-A, was a matter explicitly decided
153upon by the Council.23 Therefore, when Article 26.3.2 refers to internal
154requirements and procedures, this could either relate to the internal EU
155preparation of the decision of the CETA joint committee by means of a
156Council position adopted under Article 218(9), or to mandating the Commission,
20See for example Art. 15.4 EU Korea Free Trade Agreement. Prior acceptance by the parties is
stipulated only with regard to decisions that amend the Agreement (Art. 15.5.2).
21N. Appel, Das internationale Kooperationsrecht der EU (Springer 2016) p. 211 ff.
22Art. 218(7) is a further simplification of para. (9), seeOpinion of A.G. Sharpston in ECJ 16 July
2015, Case C-73/14, Council v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2015:490, para. 67; Opinion of A.G.
Szpunar in ECJ 24 April 2017, Case C-600/14,Germany vCouncil ECLI:EU:C:2017:296, para. 57.
23See Art. 2 of the Council Decision 2017/38 on the provisional application of CETA, OJ 2017 L
11/1080.
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157which is then allowed to express consent on behalf of the EU, as envisaged in
158Article 218(7) TFEU.
159Accordingly, and generally speaking, decisions taken by the CETA joint
160committee immediately become binding on the parties under international law
161once adopted by it. The exercise of its decision-making powers is accompanied by
162the Council deciding the EU’s position in preparation of the adoption of the
163committee decision. The committee decision is not subject to subsequent approval
164by other EU or Member State institutions. Ratification is generally not a
165requirement for making committee decisions binding on the parties. The decisions
166become binding on parties merely by virtue of their adoption by the CETA joint
167committee. This understanding of Article 26.3.2 is further confirmed by the fact
168that, with regard to certain committee decisions, CETA expressly establishes the
169requirement of approval by the parties (see Articles 2.4.4, 5.14.2(d), 11.3.6),
170which would be superfluous if Article 26.3.2 CETA had already contained such a
171requirement.
172One could contest this interpretation of Article 26.3.2 CETA, however. The
173parenthesis could be understood to require subsequent acceptance by the parties.
174Thus, both the German and English texts make the binding effect of the decision
175subject to the completion of internal requirements, seemingly as if these
176procedures were to be carried out after the committee’s decision. Read thusly, the
177decision would not be binding on the parties until additional consent had been
178granted under their internal procedures; the mere adoption of a decision by the
179committee would not be sufficient for its binding force on the parties. In that case,
180Article 218(9) TFEU would not apply since it only regulates the adoption of the
181EU’s position prior to decision-making by a committee. If one were to understand
182Article 26.3.2 CETA in this way, any detrimental effects of committee decision-
183making on national sovereignty or EU competences would be avoided, as the
184committee’s decisions would become binding on the parties only by virtue of their
185explicit consent afterwards. There are, however, two objections to such an
186interpretation. First, the parenthesis’ reference relates to the completion of ‘any
187necessary’ internal requirements and procedures. If the limiting clause establishes a
188requirement for parties to give their subsequent consent, why limit this to certain,
189i.e. necessary, cases? It is submitted here that the limiting clause merely states the
190obvious: it is the internal law of the parties that determines which domestic
191procedures apply. Hence, for the EU, the simplified procedures of either
192Article 218(7) or Article 218(9) TFEU apply. The second objection against
193understanding the parenthesis as a requirement for subsequent approval by the
194parties relates to the fact that CETA, in only a very few rules, explicitly refers to the
195approval of the parties (see above).
196In sum, the general rule on the binding force of decisions taken by the CETA
197joint committee in Article 26.3.2 CETA provides for autonomous binding force
7Delegation to treaty bodies in EU agreements
198on the parties. It cannot be understood as a reference to their ordinary treaty-
199making procedures. The simplified procedures of Article 218(7) or Article 218(9)
200TFEU apply. This finding is in conformity with EU practice in other agreements.
201As regards the numerous specialised committees, the autonomous binding
202force of their decisions is regulated by Article 26.2.4 CETA, according to which
203the special committees take decisions when CETA so provides. In contrast to the
204CETA joint committee, the binding force of the decisions of the specialised
205committees is not explicitly stated. But this is not a bar to their binding force.
206The lack of an explicit statement on binding force is not a peculiarity of the
207CETA – there are other EU agreements that fail to explicitly clarify the binding
208nature of the decisions of their treaty bodies.24 The binding effect on parties can be
209deduced from the context, as is also the case with other EU agreements: CETA
210distinguishes decisions from recommendations, the latter being a non-binding
211form of action.25 Article 26.2.4 does not impose a requirement for ratification
212or subsequent acceptance by the parties for the binding force of the decisions
213to come into effect. On the contrary, some of the CETA provisions that envisage
214decision-making powers for the specialised committees explicitly establish a
215specific requirement to that effect.26 In those articles, parties’ consent by recourse
216to domestic procedures is expressly required (which, again, are not specified
217in any detail). These special arrangements confirm that the general rule of
218Article 26.2.4 CETA is that the decisions of specialised committees have binding
219force on the parties without further ado; it does not demand any subsequent
220acceptance or ratification by the parties. As in the case of the CETA joint
221committee, the decisions of the specialised committees are, in principle, binding
222upon the parties.
223In conclusion, the autonomous binding force of the decisions by the CETA
224committees can be inferred from Articles 26.1 and 26.3 CETA, as regards the joint
225committee, and from Article 26.2, in particular Article 26.2.4 CETA, as regards
226the specialised committees. Apart from a few exceptions, their binding force does
227not generally depend on subsequent domestic approval or even ratification
228procedures. The treaty bodies’ decisions become binding on the parties upon their
229adoption (unless a different date of entry into force has been foreseen).
230Conferral of public powers on committees
231Along with independent binding decision-making competences, public powers
232have been transferred to the committees by the EU and its member states with the
24Appel, supra n. 21, p. 212.
25For recommendations see Art. 8.10.3, Art. 8.44.3(a), (d) and (e), Art. 23.11.5 CETA.
26See Art. 5.14.2(d) CETA; Art. 11.3.6 CETA.
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233provisional entry into force of CETA.27 One could contend, however, that since
234decisions must be adopted unanimously (see above), their content is effectively
235shaped by the Council decision under Article 218(9) TFEU. Consequently, one
236might opine that it is the Council that exercises public powers and not the
237committees, and that decision-making by treaty bodies is nothing more than a
238simplified way for the Council to enter into international agreements,28 and
239therefore not a genuine transfer of public power by virtue of an EU mandate
240delegating it to the treaty bodies.29
241There are, however, several factors that contradict such an understanding of the
242committees’ decision-making as a delegation to the Council. First, the deliberate
243inclusion in EU primary law of rules for decision-making in committees; the
244possibility of majority voting in international institutions; the binding effect of
245decisions simply by virtue of their adoption by treaty bodies; the fact that the
246Council can allow the EU representative in a committee a degree of discretion,
247which results in a bit of leeway for decision-making within the committee;30 and
248finally, the wording of Article 218(9) TFEU, according to which the bodies
249themselves are responsible for the adoption of acts having legal effects (and not for
250the acceptance of EU treaty proposals), all argue in favour of seeing the adoption of
251legal acts as an exercise of the public power conferred upon the treaty bodies. This,
252in Dashwood’s terms, is ‘an additional way of making E[U] law’.31 Second, a
253Council decision under Article 218(9) TFEU would remain a futile exercise if
254there were no subsequent committee decision; the Council decision is merely a
255preparatory action, and is addressed exclusively to the EU representatives.32 Third,
256it is the committees’ decisions that, in the view of the European Court of Justice,
27The provisional application of CETA as from 21 September 2017 does not comprise those
Committee competences which are enshrined in CETA Chapter 8, see Art. 1 Council Decision
2017/38, 2017 OJ L 11/1080 and the notice concerning the provisional application of the CETA,
2017 OJ L 238/9. Hence, the present analysis applies to them once they enter into force.
28The evolutionary history would militate in favour of this, see the exploration of the ECJ case law
in Appel, supra n. 21, p. 328.
29 In favour of the latter see A. von Bogdandy et al., ‘Legal Instruments in European Union Law
and their Reform: A Systematic Approach on an Empirical Basis’, 23 YBEL (2004) p. 91 at p. 130;
see also Alemanno, supra n. 9, p. 636.
30See e.g. Art. 2(2) Council Decision 11436/12; T. Giegerich, ‘Article 218 AEUV’, in
M. Pechstein et al. (eds.), Frankfurter Kommentar zu EUV, GRC und AEUV (Mohr Siebeck 2017)
marginal note 175.
31A. Dashwood, ‘External Relations Provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty’, 35 CML Rev (1998)
p. 1019 at p. 1026.
32This may explain why not all Council decisions under Art. 218(9) are published in the Official
Journal, see Art. 297(2) TFEU.
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257may influence the content of EU legislation33 and which form an integral part of
258the EU legal system.34 Hence, Article 218(9) and also Article 218(7) constitute
259special regimes for the adoption of secondary law within international
260organisations or treaty bodies.35 In the Court of Justice’s words: Article 218(9)
261provides by way of derogation from the ordinary procedure, ‘a simplified
262procedure for deciding on the positions to be adopted on behalf of the European
263Union … within a decision-making body [that adopts] acts applying or
264implementing that agreement’.36
265Some might also contend that committee decisions are not the result of a
266transfer of power, as they are not directly effective within the EU or within any
267national legal order: they still need to be implemented by domestic authorities or
268legislators. This objection arises from the premise that an exercise of public
269function must be relevant not only for the parties to a treaty, but also within their
270domestic legal orders. Otherwise, a committee decision would be strictly an act
271under international law, binding on the parties on the international plane, relevant
272for and in inter-governmental relations, but not directly so for domestic actors.
273According to such a view, a transfer of powers would necessarily require that the
274resulting legal acts were directly relevant at the domestic level, within the domestic
275legal order of the parties, i.e. the EU and its Member States. Indeed, the CETA,
276contrary toother EU agreements, is not directly applicable pursuant to Article
27730.6.1 CETA.37 Consequently, the decisions of CETA committees do not have
278direct effect beyond their international binding force.
279The lack of direct effect, however, does not mean that there has been no transfer
280of powers. I make two arguments for this. First, the whole body of EU law is the
281result of a conferral of competences by the Member States to the EU. The EU
282Treaties perceive the exercise of EU competences as a result of conferred powers:
283see Article 4(1), Article 5(1), (2) TEU and Article 2(1), (2), Article 4(1) TFEU.
33See ECJ 24 October 2014, Case C-399/12, Germany v Council ECLI:EU:C:2014:2258, para.
63. For practical examples see J. Czuczai, ‘The Autonomy of the EU Legal Order and the Law-
making Activities of International Organizations: Some Examples Regarding the Council’s most
Recent Practice’, 31(1) Yearbook of European Law (2012) p. 452.
34See ECJ 14 November 1989, Case 30/88, Hellenic Republic v Commission of the European
Communities ECLI:EU:C:1989:422, para. 13. N. Lavranos, Legal Interaction between Decisions of
International Organisations and European Law (Europa 2004) p. 35 ff, 53, 93.
35Appel, supra n. 21, p. 324 ff; Opinion of A.G. Szpunar, supra n. 22, para. 58, 162.
International delegation does not require transfer of powers to a body that is independent from the
parties and has its own will, cf Lavranos, supra n. 34, p. 79 ff; Bradley and Kelly, supra n. 3, p. 6 ff.
36ECJ 6 October 2015, Case C-73/14, Council v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2015:663, para. 65.
37See also Art. 17.15 EU Singapore Free Trade Agreement. An explicit treaty rule on (the
exclusion of) direct effect is binding on the ECJ, see ECJ 13 January 2015, Case C-401/12 P, Council
and Others v Vereniging Milieudefensie and Stichting Stop Luchtverontreiniging Utrecht ECLI:EU:
C:2015:4, para. 53.
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284Hence, what matters is the exercise of competences in a binding legal form, and
285not the direct effect of the legal acts adopted. Even though some EU competences
286were, and still are, limited to the adoption of directives in the sense of Article 288
287TFEU (which are generally not directly effective), the relevant competences38
288nevertheless are the result of a conferral of powers.
289Second, even though the direct effect of CETA is excluded,39 Article 216(2)
290TFEU still applies. Accordingly, EU institutions and the Member States are
291bound by international agreements entered into by the EU, and by their bodies’
292decisions (even though the wording of Article 216(2) only pertains to agreements).
293It is a constant in the case law of the European Court of Justice (although,
294admittedly, not based on Article 216(2) or its predecessors) that those decisions
295form an integral part of EU law, since they are directly connected and the latter
296give effect to the former.40 Binding force under EU lawmeans that the EU and the
297Member State institutions are not only obliged to implement the committees’
298decisions under international law and by virtue of an international legal obligation,
299but also under EU law. The legal effect that Article 216(2) TFEU imparts
300on CETA would be disregarded by the above-mentioned view. Article 216(2)
301TFEU does not apply exclusively to directly effective international treaties.41
302Even though the exclusion of CETA’s direct effect clearly restrains its force
303within the EU and Member States’ legal orders, this does not mean – and due to
304Article 216(2) TFEU cannot mean – that CETA and its committees’ decisions do
305not have any legal effect at all within the EU and national legal orders.42 The EU
306organs cannot deviate from Article 216(2) TFEU, nor are they able to exclude its
38See e.g. Arts. 23(2), 52(2), 53(1), 59(1), 82(2) TFEU.
39The exclusion of direct effect in my opinion does not relate to the investment court systemm as
its decisions must be enforced by domestic courts without any further implementation measure, see
Art. 8.41.2 CETA. This issue, however, is not relevant for the time being as provisional application
of CETA does not comprise the ISDS mechanism.
40Hellenic Republic v Commission of the European Communities, supra n. 34, para. 13; ECJ
20 September 1990, Case C-192/89, Sevince v Staatssecretaris van Justitie ECLI:EU:C:1990:322,
para. 9. Not least in the case of an EU free trade agreement, they enjoy the same legal status as the
agreements. See R.A. Wessel and S. Blockmans, The Legal Status and Influence of Decisions of
International Organizations and other Bodies in the EU, Brugge Research Paper 1/2014, p. 20. The
ECJ refers to Art. 216(2) only with regard to the agreements themselves, see ECJ 16 July 2015, Case
C-612/13 P, ClientEarth v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2015:486, para. 33.
41 In the cases cited above, direct effect of the treaty bodies’ decisions was not an issue. The
character of such a decision as an integral part of EU law does not require its direct effect, nor even its
legal binding force; for the latter see ECJ 21 January 1993, Case C-188/91, Deutsche Shell AG v
Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Harburg ECLI:EU:C:1993:24, para 17-18; M. Mendez, The Legal Effects of
EU Agreements (Oxford University Press 2013) p. 113 ff. See also Taflan-Met, supra n. 1, para. 18 ff,
where the Court distinguished between the binding force of a treaty-body decision for the Member
States and the issue of its direct effect.
42See again Deutsche Shell AG, supra n. 41, paras. 17-18.
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307legal effect in international agreements as Article 216(2) is primary EU law. One
308legal effect implied by this has already been mentioned: the implementation
309obligation is not only an international legal obligation but is also an obligation
310under EU law; the decisions and their legal effect become ‘unionised’.43 The EU
311and national institutions must pay respect to the CETA and its committees’
312decisions. They must implement them;44 they must consider them when adopting
313secondary law.
314Consequently, committee decisions are relevant facts for public institutions in
315the EU. They are legal facts that cannot be ignored under EU law even though
316they are not directly effective. EU and national institutions have a primary legal
317obligation to implement and respect them.
318In consequence, the establishment of the competences of the committees is the
319result of exercising public authority and competence of the EU (and the Member
320States) to enter into international treaties. Likewise, the use of these competences,
321i.e. of decision-making powers that CETA grants to the committees, constitutes
322an exercise of public power, as the decisions adopted are legally binding on EU and
323national institutions, even though only to a limited extent when compared to
324directly effective EU agreements. Issuing binding and internally relevant decisions
325is an exercise of public power.
326Conferral of power by the EU to international institutions –
327legal base and no limits? The role of Article 218(9) TFEU
328As we are able to observe a transfer of public power to the committees effectuated by
329entering into CETA, the question arises as to whether the EU is competent to
330transfer the sovereign rights it was granted by the member states to new institutions
331of public international law. If not, the EU may have acted ultra vires since it remains
332subject to the principle of conferral that governs EU competences and the limitations
333on them (Article 5(1) TEU). This is an unavoidable conclusion – at least insofar as
334the committees enjoy powers that go beyond the mere execution of the agreement’s
335provisions.45 As shown, the decision-making powers of CETA committees go
336beyond purely technical issues and comprise legislative and regulatory functions.
43Cf Lavranos, supra n. 34, p. 60; Appel, supra n. 21, p. 384 ff.
44This is in line with the maximalist enforcement paradigm of the ECJ as regards EU Agreements,
see Mendez, supra n. 41, p. 157. The binding force for the member states of a treaty-body decision
established by a mixed agreement does not depend on the adoption of implementing measures, see
Taflan-Met, supra n. 1, para. 19-22.
45Recently, ECJ 25 October 2017, Case C-687/15, European Commission v Council ECLI:EU:
C:2017:803, para. 48-49 confirmed the constitutional significance of respecting the principle of
allocation of powers also with regard to international action of the EU.
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337The explicit competence of the EU to establish decision-making treaty bodies
338in free trade agreements is rather sparsely indicated, although it is implied by
339Article 218(9) and provided for by Article 218(7) TFEU.
340EU primary law does not explicitly envisage the EU transferring decision-making
341powers to treaty bodies by means of international agreements. However, Article 217
342gives some indication in that regard; the EU is entitled to establish common actions
343and special procedures in association agreements. This implies that common treaty
344bodies can exercise decision-making powers. Their competences, however, are not
345specified in any detail.
346Beyond that, there are only indirect statements in procedural rules: Article 218
347(6)lit.(a)(iii) TFEU provides that the European Parliament must consent to
348agreements that establish institutional cooperation procedures, which inherently
349confirms the permissibility of decision-making treaty bodies.
350The same applies to the procedural rule laid down in Article 218(9) TFEU,
351according to which the Council defines the EU position to be adopted in bodies
352set up per agreement. This rule was only introduced into primary EU law upon
353conclusion of the Treaty of Amsterdam46 (then Article 300(2), subparagraph 2
354ECT); it was intended to replace the less practicable legal situation that, in line
355with the jurisprudence of the ECJ, in the absence of specific procedural rules, any
356decision in an international forum in which the (then) EC participated had to be
357seen as the conclusion of an international agreement by the EC.47 The new rule
358(now Article 218(9) TFEU) should allow for a simplification of the procedure.48
359This also explains the introduction of the rule within the context of a procedural
360provision. Article 218(9) not only impliedly confirms the competence of the EU
361to establish treaty bodies, but explicitly provides for their competences to a certain
362degree: the treaty bodies can ‘adopt acts having legal effects’.
363The Treaty of Nice had already broadened the EU’s capacity to set up such
364decision-making bodies by extending it to all types of EU agreement; in Article 300(2)
365subparagraph 2 ECT-Amsterdam there was a reference to agreements ‘under Article
366310’ (Association Agreements) that has been removed by the Treaty of Nice.49
46For the genesis of Art. 218(9) TFEU see the Opinion of A.G. Cruz Villalon in ECJ 24 October
2014, Case C-399/12, Germany v Council ECLI:EU:C:2014:289, para. 39 ff; A. Dashwood, ‘EU
Acts and Member State Acts in the Negotiation, Conclusion, and Implementation of International
Agreements’, in M. Cremona and C. Kilpatrick (eds.), EU Legal Acts (Oxford University Press 2018)
p. 189 at p. 228 ff.
47See ECJ, Opinion 1/78 ECLI:EU:C:1979:224, para. 51; see alsoOpinion of A.G. Cruz Villalon
in Germany v Council, supra n. 46, para. 44-45. With regard to some treaty bodies in EU
Agreements, specific arrangements or procedures had been concluded between Council and
Commission or provided in the concluding act, see Dashwood, supra n. 31, p. 1025.
48Opinion of A.G. Cruz Villalon in Germany v Council, supra n. 46, para. 80.
49Opinion of A.G. Cruz Villalon in Germany v Council, supra n. 46, paras. 51, 80.
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367The European Court of Justice has, for a long time, assumed an implied
368competence of the EU to establish international institutions and to provide them
369with ‘appropriate powers of decision’.50 The capacity to establish decision-making
370bodies is inherently part of the substantive competences of the EU to conclude
371international agreements (see current Article 216(1) TFEU).51 The
372abovementioned procedural rules confirm this assumption. Thus, the EU has
373the power to provide for such bodies as part of its international treaty-making
374competence as enshrined in the TFEU.
375Recourse to the EU;s substantive treaty-making powers for the legitimation of
376treaty bodies does not, however, clarify the type of their public powers. As already
377noted, the European Court of Justice describes the role of the treaty bodies
378mentioned in Article 218(9) TFEU as ‘decision-making bodies set up by
379international agreements [that adopt] acts applying or implementing that
380agreement’,52 without, however, providing any further guidance. Neither Article
381218(9) TFEU nor the other rules referred to above give any further indication as to
382the nature and scope of public powers to be conferred on treaty bodies. Article 218
383(9) TFEU merely implies that the competence exists with respect to acts ‘having
384legal effect’. This concept includes binding legal acts, but also comprises –
385according to a recent decision of the European Court of Justice53 – mere
386recommendations which influence the content of EU legislation, for example
387through references. This is a broad, rather vague concept, which does not refer to
388any particular form or type of action.54
389That a wide range of public powers can be transferred to treaty bodies can also
390be concluded from the development of the terminology used in Article 218(9).
391The textual change brought about by the Treaty of Lisbon supports a breadth of
392transferable sovereignty functions. Whereas before Lisbon the terminology was
393‘legally effective decisions’ (see Article 300(2) sub-section 2 ECT), Article 218(9)
394TFEU now reads ‘acts having legal effects’. This change in terminology wrought
395by the Treaty of Lisbon can also be observed in other language versions.55 The
396terminological change draws on the Constitutional Treaty (Article III-325) and
50ECJ 26 April 1977, Opinion 1/76 ECLI:EU:C:1977:63, para. 5
51See recently ECJ 16 May 2017, Opinion 2/15 ECLI:EU:C:2017:376, para. 276; ECJ 18
December 2014, Case C-81/13, UK v Council of the EU ECLI:EU:C:2014:2449, para. 61; ECJ 5
December 2017, Case C-600/14, Germany v Council ECLI:EU:C:2017:935, para. 60.
52Council v Commission, supra n. 36, para. 65.
53Germany v Council, supra n. 33, para. 56 ff, 63 ff.
54 In contrast, Opinion of A.G. Cruz Villalon in Germany v Council, supra n. 46, paras. 89-99
opined that Art. 218(9) applied only to acts which have binding force under international law.
55 In the French version one can observe the change from ‘des décisions ayant des effets juridiques’
in Art. 300(2) subpara. 2 ECT to ‘des actes ayant des effets juridiques’ in Art. 218(9) TFEU, in the
German version from ‘rechtswirksame Beschlüsse’ to ‘rechtswirksame Akte’.
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397the Convention draft (Article III-227(10)) and has been incorporated into the
398Reform Treaty. In the Convention draft, the change in terminology came about
399only during the textual adjustment phase following the June 2003 European
400Council meeting in Thessaloniki, probably to bring it in line with the terminology
401for the various forms of EU legal acts which, with the Treaty of Lisbon, had been
402newly regulated and adapted to reflect common practice. Therefore, one could
403conclude that the new terminology was not intended to extend the powers of the
404treaty bodies beyond those acts previously designated by the term ‘decision’.56
405Nevertheless, the objective change in terminology indicates that the acts adopted
406by treaty bodies could cover all forms of legal action. Under the Treaty of Lisbon,
407the EU primary law term ‘decision’ denotes an action which is either a single-case
408decision addressed to certain addressees or a general rule-making act addressed to
409an undefined multitude of addressees (‘rule making decision’57): see Article 288(4)
410TFEU.58
411Binding acts can indeed be adopted by different branches of government.
412Binding acts can be individual decisions, decisions addressed to an unlimited
413group of addressees, legislative and generally applicable executive rule-making, but
414are also understood to include non-legally-binding acts that can nevertheless have
415legal effects. Further justification for a broad conception of the term ‘acts having
416legal effects’ is provided by the fact that today’s EU law, like earlier EC law, has a
417wide range of legal forms of action which can be the result of the exercise of powers
418in the field of foreign affairs, legislative powers, subordinate legislation, or even
419purely administrative regulation or executive single case decision-making.59 While
420the plethora of forms of Union acts cannot without further ado be transferred to
421the level of international law,60 international legal practice too has very diverse
422forms of, and terminology for, international acts. The concept of ‘acts having legal
423effects’ in Article 218(9) TFEU refers to the acts of treaty bodies adopted at the
424international level. Frequently, these are concrete decisions adopted to implement
425the international mandates envisaged by the agreements, but they can also
426comprise abstract rule-making. The available forms of action and their
427concomitant legal effects are thus determined by international treaty, and in the
428absence of explicit rules therein, by general international law. Treaty bodies can
56SeeOpinion of A.G. Cruz Villalon in Germany v Council, supra n. 46, para. 52 who opines that
the changes in Art. 218(9) did not imply ‘fundamental changes of substance’.
57K. Bradley, ‘Legislating in the EU’, in C. Barnard and S. Peers (eds.), European Union Law
(Oxford University Press 2014) p. 97 at p. 101.
58See D. Chalmers et al., European Union Law, 3rd edn (Cambridge University Press 2014)
p. 112.
59A. von Bogdandy et al., ‘Handlungsformen im Unionsrecht’, 62 Heidelberg Journal of
International Law (2002) p. 77 at p. 147 ff.
60See also von Bogdandy et al., supra n. 29, p. 129.
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429adopt different forms of action, just as agreements under international law can
430contain different types of rule. They can coordinate the behaviour of parties or set
431rules that aim to influence internal legislation, as delegation to treaty bodies can
432pertain to both legislative and regulatory mandates, as is the case in CETA (see
433above). The indeterminate formulation used in Article 218(9) internally reflects
434this; it is incapable of limiting the type of authority conferrable to treaty bodies in
435any meaningful way.
436In conclusion, one can state that neither the relevant substantive competence
437provisions in the EU treaties nor the procedural rule in Article 218(9) TFEU
438indicate in specific, let alone precise, terms which kind of public authority may be
439delegated to treaty bodies. The legal foundations for conferring powers to treaty
440bodies are highly inaccurate in this respect. International practice and the vague
441wording of Article 218(9) hint at a broad conception of powers conferrable to
442treaty bodies. Consequently, one must conclude that the public powers
443conferrable by the EU to treaty bodies may be very extensive and comprehensive.
444The conferral of power and democratic legitimacy
445The European Parliament’s limited role in the conferral and exercise of power by the
446committees, and resulting legitimacy concerns
447Up to this point, I have shown that Article 218(7) and (9) TFEU provide for
448simplified procedures for entering into international commitments based on
449mandates in EU agreements that confer public powers on treaty bodies. Under
450Article 218(9), these powers can be very extensive as their substance is only broadly
451described there (apart from the constraint concerning the institutional framework),
452but also under Article 218(7) even though it only applies to modifications to
453agreements. The legal significance of the treaty-body decisions is considerable, as
454they are binding under both international and EU law as soon as they are adopted by
455the treaty bodies; as shown above, only a very few CETA committee decisions
456require subsequent adoption or ratification by the parties in order to become
457binding upon them. As these powers – under CETA in particular – pertain to
458legislative and regulatory functions, one may wonder what the role of the European
459Parliament is in their conferral as committee’s decisions could interfere with its
460functions, especially if these decisions have an impact on political choices or if their
461implementation requires changes to EU legislative acts.
462As already mentioned, Article 218(9) TFEU provides that a decision on the EU
463position in the decision-making of a committee is adopted by the Council acting
464on a proposal by the Commission; similarly, only the Council acts under Article
465218(7) TFEU. In both instances, the European Parliament is not involved in the
466decision-making of the Council. Neither does a right of the European Parliament
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467to approve a Council decision under Article 218(9) result from the substantive
468legal bases for Council decisions: as shown above, the EU’s external competences
469as established in Articles 207 and 217 TFEU form the substantive legal basis also
470for Council decisions under Article 218(9) TFEU, but their procedural
471consequences for entering into agreements for the involvement of the European
472Parliament (see Article 218(6)) do not apply to the decision-making of Article
473218(9), as the latter rule is a lex specialis as such.61
474The European Parliament is merely informed of the positions under Article
475218(10) TFEU; the information ‘at all stages of the procedure’ includes information
476on the positions taken by the Council in preparation of a decision taken by a treaty
477body. Likewise, the European Parliament is informed in the event the Council makes
478use of Article 218(7) TFEU with regard to agreements that require the European
479Parliament’s consent.62 In the past, the immediate disclosure of a Council position to
480the European Parliament was explicitly provided for by Article 300(2) ECT
481Amsterdam/Nice.63 The provision of information to the European Parliament on
482such Council positions was not altered by the Lisbon Treaty even though it is no
483longer expressly mentioned. The Lisbon Treaty’s general information rule in
484Article 218(10) TFEU aims at increasing the information given to the European
485Parliament, and not at withholding information about Council positions on
486decision-making in treaty bodies from the European Parliament. Article 109 of the
487Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament gives it the ability to hold debates and
488issue recommendations (including requests to the Council) once the Commission
489has proposed a position to be adopted on the EU’s behalf in a treaty body. There
490are, however, no ‘comply or explain mechanisms’ in place regarding these
491recommendations, nor does the European Parliament have any say in the adoption
492of a Council decision taken under Article 218(9).
493The exclusion of the European Parliament from involvement in Council
494decision-making in preparation of a treaty-body decision is rooted in tradition.
495The simplified procedures developed in certain instances before the introduction
496of Article 218(9) TFEU/300 ECT by the Amsterdam Treaty, intentionally left out
497any role for the European Parliament, as this was held to be impracticable due to
498the frequency with which such positions might be required.64 In the same vein,
499the formulation of Article 300(2) ECT, the predecessor of Article 218(9) TFEU,
500was drafted in such a way as to derogate from the role the European Parliament
61See mutatis mutandis UK v Council of the EU, supra n. 51, para. 66.
62See Annex III, para. 9 of the Framework Agreement between Commission and European
Parliament, 2010 OJ 304/47.
63See B. Martenczuk, ‘Decisions of Bodies Established by International Agreements and the
Community Legal Order’ in V. Kronenberger (ed.), The EU and the International Legal Order (Asser
Press 2001) p. 141 at p. 150 ff.
64Dashwood, supra n. 46, p. 189 at p. 230.
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501had in concluding international agreements (apart from the exception with regard
502to changes to the institutional framework).65
503Hence, it is the Council alone that – based on a Commission proposal –
504determines the EU’s position and therefore shapes the content of treaty body
505decisions for the EU. As treaty body decisions become binding once adopted, the
506Council decision-making under Article 218(9) that determines the EU position to
507be presented by the EU representative in the committee is the last stage at which
508the substance of a CETA committee decision with binding effect for the EU
509legal order can be influenced (or its adoption even avoided) on behalf of the EU.
510The European Parliament has no say in this respect. Decisions of the committees
511may, however, create new rules by way of their legislative and regulatory function
512whose adoption would have been a competence of the EU legislature, i.e. a joint
513competence of the Council and the European Parliament. In the same way, if a
514committee decision requires the adoption of implementing rules by the EU
515legislature, the European Parliament might, without prior involvement, be bound
516by the substance of the committee decision. Hence, the conferral of powers to
517treaty bodies could circumvent essential procedural rules established in EU
518primary law.66
519Such concerns are not assuaged by the participation of the European Parliament
520in the decision-making of the committees themselves. CETA does not grant any
521role to parliaments in the decision-making processes of its committees. The EU is
522represented, as has already been shown, by the Commission. Nor does CETA
523provide any other accountability mechanism with regard to committee decision-
524making.67 The internal rule-making procedures of the EU do not provide the
525European Parliament with any status (e.g. as observer) in CETA committees.68
526The legitimacy of committee decisions might ultimately be rooted in the
527European Parliament’s consent to CETA. The European Parliament is involved in
528the delegation of powers to treaty bodies as these powers are determined by the
529enabling EU agreement. By consenting to the empowering treaties (as required under
65Dashwood, supra n. 46, p. 231; P. Eeckhout, EU External Relations Law, 2nd edn (Oxford
University Press 2011) p. 208.
66This concern was already raised with regard to Association Council decisions by N. Neuwahl,
‘The European Parliament and Association Council Decisions: The example of Decisions 1/95 of the
EC/Turkey Association Council’, 33 CMLRev (1996) p. 51 at p. 56.
67Chapter 27Q2 on Transparency contains stipulations only with regard to domestic
implementation. The legitimacy concerns caused by the restraining effects treaties have for public
participation lack participatory standards established in EU law, and may even deplete these
standards in their implementation, see J. Mendes, ‘EU law and global regulatory regimes: Hollowing
out procedural standards’, 10(4) International Journal of Constitutional Law (2012) p. 988.
68Para. 26 of the Framework Agreement, supra n. 62, provides for a possible observer status for
Members of the European Parliament at meetings of decision-making bodies set up by multilateral
agreements only, not with regard to bilateral ones.
18 Wolfgang Weiß EuConst 00 (2018)
530Lisbon rules to a considerably greater extent than previously),69 the European
531Parliament also agrees to the treaty-body decision-making mandates provided
532therein. From a formal perspective, the public powers of the committees would
533appear to be legitimate as they have been the subject of parliamentary decision.
534Nevertheless, considerable concern remains as to the legitimacy of the treaty
535bodies’ exercise of powers pertaining to legislative or regulatory functions or that
536have fundamental political importance or significance for individuals, as the
537European Parliament’s general consent to a treaty might not convey sufficient
538legitimacy to such mandates. From a substantive perspective, the more precisely
539treaty-body mandates are defined by the treaty (i.e. the more detailed the content
540of their decisions is prescribed in substantive terms in the treaties), the more
541legitimate general European Parliament consent to the treaty makes them.
542A substantive assignment of legitimacy in this way can only work if the content of
543a decision is pre-specified by substantive prescriptions of the European Parliament
544or with its approval. The density of the substantive prescriptions for treaty-body
545decisions is therefore decisive for the level of legitimacy conveyed by the European
546Parliament. If and insofar as these prescriptions are imprecise because the treaty
547assigns wide discretion to its bodies, the European Parliament’s consent merely
548conveys formal – but not substantive – legitimacy. The legitimacy concerns are all
549the more founded given the CETA committees’ regulatory and even legislative
550functions. In this sense, the decisions do not merely spell out specifications already
551laid out in the CETA text. The different categories of public power mandated to
552the CETA committees prompt the need for differentiation when examining the
553requirements of their legitimacy.
554Legitimacy requirements must take the significance and relevance of a decision
555into account. The more profound the consequences of a decision, the more
556important the tasks and powers assigned to the decision-making body, and the
557more leeway it enjoys, the greater the legitimacy demands. This means that general
558consent to an open-termed mandate is not sufficient for vesting legitimacy in the
559exercise of rule-making powers by a committee. Conversely, legitimacy
560requirements are negligible if the exercise of power does not lead to externally
561binding decisions nor affects the rights of individuals. The absence of supervisory
562and control structures to oversee international institutions may in turn increase
563legitimacy demands. The link between the extent of the powers transferred and the
564level of legitimacy requirements has been stated by the German Constitutional
565Court: ‘The constitutional requirements placed by the principle of democracy on
566the organisational structure and the decision-making procedures… depend on the
567extent to which sovereign responsibilities are transferred … and the degree of
568political independence in the exercise of the… powers transferred.… [T]he level
69See Art. 218 VI(ii), (iii) TFEU.
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569of democratic legitimation [must be] commensurate with the extent and
570importance of supranational power’.70 This is transferable to the present context
571of democratic requirements for the conferral of powers by the EU, all the more
572since the European Court of Justice, in conceiving the principle of democracy in
573the EU, draws from the traditions of national democracies.71 The fundamental
574insight to be gleaned here is that a lack of precision in the definition of extensive,
575significant powers conferred on treaty bodies makes it even less likely that the
576European Parliament’s consent to the treaties can grant the powers sufficient
577democratic legitimacy. The mandates must be specifically set out and clearly
578described in the empowering treaty provision, as a requirement of democratic
579legitimacy.72
580Thus, there may be constitutional constraints or safeguards (such as control
581rights, or a requirement of specificity of mandates) for the transfer of extensive
582powers to treaty bodies such as to the CETA committees). Before these are
583explored in the next section, a few potential objections need to be addressed.
584Sufficient legitimacy by the Council?
585One argument against the above legitimacy concerns that arise due to a lack of
586European Parliament participation could be the fact that the sole competence of
587the Council under Article 218(7) and (9) is in perfect alignment with EU
588democracy requirements; the European Parliament is not the sole law-maker in
589the EU and the Council performs executive functions, in particular in the area of
590external relations which is not the role of a parliament.
591Under EU law, according to Article 10(2) TEU the democratic legitimation of
592EU legal acts rests on two pillars, namely the Member State representatives in the
593Council who are accountable to their constituency and the legitimacy ensured by
594the European Parliament, the latter being the genuine supranational pillar. In
595these ways, EU primary law emphasises that the exercise of public authority must
596be traceable to the will of the people (referred to as national citizens and EU
597citizens; there is no European demos) and not only to the domestic governments
598represented in the Council. Even though Article 10(2) in this way expresses that
599the dual structure of legitimacy73 is one of the more distinctive elements of the EU
600multilevel system, one cannot directly draw conclusions from this principle on the
70German Federal Constitutional Court 30 June 2009 (Lisbon Treaty), Case 2 BvE 2/08, ECLI:
DE:BVerfG:2009:es20090630.2bve000208, para. 262.
71K. Lenaerts, ‘The Principle of Democracy in the Case Law of the European Court of Justice’, 62
ICLQ (2013) p. 271 at p. 280.
72Appel, supra n. 21, p. 303.
73A von Bogdandy, ‘Founding Principles’, in A. von Bogdandy and J. Bast (eds.), Principles of
European Constitutional Law, 2nd edn (Hart 2009) p. 11 at p. 49.
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601correct allocation of accountability mechanisms between the two pillars. In the
602present context of transferring powers to committees, one could, however, state
603that since decisions on the EU position in treaty bodies are adopted by the Council
604acting alone and the European Parliament does not have a say, democratic
605legitimacy predominantly rests upon the Member State pillar.
606The genuine supranational pillar conveys legitimacy to treaty-body decisions
607only to the extent that the empowerment of a treaty body in an agreement has
608been subject to European Parliament assent. As shown, this supranational pillar
609conveys only very limited legitimacy, the sufficiency of which appears to be highly
610doubtful with regard to the conferral of legislative and regulatory powers to CETA
611committees. Legislative and regulatory powers and their delegation are, within the
612EU, shared between the Council and the European Parliament. The concrete
613shape of the dual legitimacy of the exercise of public powers in the EU depends on
614the concrete allocation of powers between Council and European Parliament in a
615given policy field. Therefore, when assessing whether decision-making on the
616exercise of powers conferred to a treaty body by the Council alone conforms to EU
617standards of legitimacy, it is essential to explore the issue-specific internal,
618domestic, allocation of power between European Parliament and Council instead
619of trying to draw abstract conclusions from the principle of dual legitimacy. On a
620theoretical level, one could postulate that the legitimacy bestowed on a legal act is
621greater if the European Parliament contributes to it. The European Parliament is
622indeed the forum for pluralistic deliberation of political issues in which diverse
623aspects of common interest to the EU can be fed into the rule-making procedure.
624The European Parliament’s political composition engenders transnational
625discourse. In contrast, the Council predominantly represents domestic
626governments and hence a majoritarian political approach.74 This theoretical
627account of higher legitimacy of the European Parliament’s contribution is
628reflected by the development of EU primary law in which the EU’s legitimacy has
629been increased by incrementally expanding the European Parliament’s rights at
630the expense of the Council.
631Irrespective of such a theoretical account, under EU law as it presently stands
632one has to analyse the allocation of powers between Council and European
633Parliament in order to find an answer to the above question. The general allocation
74For such conception of the dual democratic legitimacy of the EU see J. von Achenbach,
Demokratische Gesetzgebung in der EU (Springer 2014) p. 300 ff, 452 ff; J. von Achenbach, ‘The
European Parliament as a Forum of National Interest? A Transnationalist Critique of Jurgen
Habermas’ Reconstruction of Degressive Proportionality’, 55(2) Journal of Common Market Studies
(2017) p. 193; R. Sangi,Die auswärtige Gewalt des Europäischen Parlaments (Springer 2018) p. 63 ff.
See also ECtHR 29 October 1997, Case No. 24833/94, Matthews v United Kingdom, para. 52: the
European Parliament ‘must be seen as that part of the European Community structure which best
reflects concerns as to “effective political democracy”’.
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634of functions between Council and European Parliament is determined by the
635typology provided by Articles 14 and 16 TEU and, with regard to external
636relations, by Article 218 TFEU. Accordingly, the Council and the European
637Parliament jointly exercise the basic parliamentary functions of legislation and
638budgeting. In addition, the European Parliament constitutes a control and
639advisory body, while the Council defines and coordinates policy. In the area of
640external treaty relations, while the Council is the treaty-making body, the
641European Parliament exercises a supervisory function as a result of its right to
642information; it has far-reaching political functions as well in relation to certain
643agreements whose conclusion by the Council require its consent (see Article
644218(6) TFEU). The European Parliament makes effective use of the consent
645requirement and its information rights and contributes to policy formation in
646informal ways, all of which allows it to co-determine the substance of any treaty
647under negotiation.75 Article 218(6) hence establishes ‘symmetry’ between the
648European Parliament’s involvement in legislation and treaty-making ‘in order to
649guarantee that the Parliament and the Council enjoy the same powers in relation
650to a given field, in compliance with the institutional balance provided for by the
651Treaties’.76 Thus, in trade policy the European Parliament exercises a considerable
652political function, almost equivalent to the Council’s, again resulting in joint
653competence.
654Consequently, postulating – based on a literal reading of Article 218(9) – that the
655Council might be solely competent under EU law to decide on the exercise of broad
656legislative or regulatory mandates by treaty bodies such as CETA committees would
657not appear to be in keeping with this joint allocation of powers to Council and
658European Parliament in legislation, delegation and treaty-making.
659A recent decision from the European Court of Justice seems to contradict this
660conclusion. Germany had complained that the Council could not adopt decisions
661under Article 218(9) TFEU if this resulted in a circumvention of the ordinary
662legislative procedure and thus, a violation of the rights of the European Parliament. In
663response, the Court merely stated that the wording of Article 218(9) did not limit EU
664action ‘to situations where it has previously adopted rules in accordance with the
665ordinary legislative procedure’.77 While this statement was correct, it failed to address
666the concerns behind Germany’s claim. In this case, the Court did not need to delve
667any deeper into the issue, as the mandates of the OTIF Revision committee at stake
75See R. Schütze, Foreign Affairs and the EU Constitution (Cambridge University Press 2014)
p. 385 ff; A. Ott, ‘The European Parliament’s Role in EU Treaty-Making’, 23(6)Maastricht Journal
of European and Comparative Law (2016) p. 1009; K. Meissner, ‘Democratizing EU External
Relations: The European Parliament’s Informal Role in SWIFT, ACTA and TTIP’, 21(2) European
Foreign Affair Review (2016) p. 269.
76ECJ 24 June 2014, Case C-658/11, Parliament v Council ECLI:EU:C:2014:2025, para. 56.
77Germany v Council, supra n. 51, para. 71.
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668did not encompass legislative functions, but only the competence to propose (rather
669than decide upon) modifications of the Convention concerning international carriage
670by rail that still required, for their entry into force, approval by the General Assembly
671and then by the parties individually.
672Towards an EU doctrine on delegation to treaty bodies:
673limitations flowing from democracy and institutional balance
674Searching for EU standards on delegation in external relations
675The above legitimacy concerns can be confirmed by exploring the constitutional
676principles for conferring powers to international decision-making bodies.
677Democracy and institutional balance in the EU place restrictions on delegation
678to treaty bodies similar to those on internal delegation. The principle of democracy
679in the EU comprises protecting the European Parliament’s prerogatives,78 which
680implies a prohibition against transferring fundamental issues to other branches of
681government apart from the legislative, and a prohibition against unspecified
682delegation. Furthermore, the delegation of rule-making to executive institutions
683requires democratic control. These restrictions on (internal) delegation under EU
684law amount to an EU (non-)delegation doctrine.79 While emanating from Articles
685290 and 291 TFEU, they are reflected in the Meroni case law and also apply to
686external relations, as Article 218(9) TFEU indicates.
687The internal assignment of powers between the executive and legislative
688branches of the EU reflects the principle of limitation on the delegation of public
689powers to the executive under EU law. The limitations to and conditions for the
690delegation of rule-making to the executive ensure democratic legitimacy and
691control. Article 290(1) TFEU imposes a rather strict limitation on delegation by
692the legislature which must reserve for itself the provision of the ‘essential elements’
693of a policy; this cannot be delegated. ‘Essential elements’ is of course not a
694straightforward concept, but it has been developed in the case law of the European
695Court of Justice and there has been a principle of legislative reservation since
696before Lisbon. Essential elements are reserved to the EU legislature because of
697their political nature; they comprise political or strategic decisions on the
698fundamental orientation of Union policy. Such decisions require immediate
78Lenaerts, supra n. 71, p. 293 ff.
79For non-delegation in other jurisdictions see R. Schütze, ‘“Delegated” legislation in the (new)
European Union: a Constitutional Analysis’, 74(5)MLR (2011) p. 661 at p. 663 ff; for Germany see
Art 80 Basic Law. R. Schütze, ‘Constitutional Limits to Delegated Powers’, in A. Antoniadis et al.
(eds.), The EU and Global Emergencies (Hart 2011) p. 49 at p. 50, was the first to use the phrase
‘delegation doctrine’ in EU constitutional law, yet focusing on the internal side, specifically EU
agencies.
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699democratic legitimation as they imply wide discretion, in particular the need for
700political choices that weigh potentially conflicting policy aims and interests.80 Not
701entirely negligible interferences with fundamental rights amount to essential
702elements of a policy as well.81 As regards non-essential elements (i.e. specification
703of regulatory details and technical aspects of legislation), the EU legislature is
704competent to unburden itself of their regulation by delegating rule-making to the
705executive (i.e. the Commission). This is, however, subject to two requirements.
706First, the legislature must define the objectives, content, scope and duration of the
707delegated rules: Article 290(1) subparagraph 2 TFEU; undefined delegation is
708prohibited.82 Even prior to Lisbon and Article 290 TFEU, the European Court of
709Justice demanded that the scope of powers and the criteria for their exercise be set
710out in the legislative act with a certain degree of specificity; they needed to be
711determined and circumscribed quite precisely.83 Second, delegation must be
712accompanied by control mechanisms, i.e. Parliament’s right to revoke the
713delegation or to reserve a veto so that it can review the exercise of the delegated
714powers and of any discretion transferred: Article 290(2) TFEU. Such mechanisms
715act as a counterbalance to derogation from the principle of separation of powers
716inherent to the delegation of public powers and thus ensure observance of the
717requirements of democratic legitimacy.84
718The conferral of implementing powers to the Commission must be provided
719for by an enabling act as well. Implementing acts are subject to scrutiny by the
720Member States according to legislative rules adopted by the Council and the
721European Parliament in Regulation 182/2011 in accordance with Article 291(2),
722(3) TFEU. In this way, the EU legislature is also involved in the allocation of
723implementing powers.85
80ECJ 5 September 2012, Case C-355/10, Parliament v Council ECLI:EU:C:2012:516, paras.
64-67, 76, 78; ECJ 27 October 1992, Case C-240/90, Germany v Council ECLI:EU:C:1992:408,
para. 37.
81Parliament v Council, supra n. 80, para, 77; ECJ 10 September 2015, Case C-363/14,
Parliament v Council ECLI:EU:C:2015:579, para. 53. See also M. den Heijer and E. Tauschinsky,
‘Where Human Rights Meet Administrative Law: Essential Elements and Limits to Delegation’, 10
EuConst (2013) p. 513 at p. 527, 533; D. Curtin and T. Manucharyan, ‘Legal Acts and Hierarchy of
Norms in EU Law’, in A. Arnull and D. Chalmers (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of European Union
Law (Oxford University Press 2015) p. 103 at p. 112.
82 In R. Schütze, ‘Constitutional Limits to Delegated Powers’, in A. Antoniadis et al. (eds.), The
EU and Global Emergencies (Hart 2011) p. 49 at p. 54 terms: specificity principle.
83See ECJ 6 December 2005, Case C-66/04, United Kingdom v Parliament and Council ECLI:
EU:C:2005:743, para. 48 f.
84Opinion of A.G. Mengozzi in ECJ 16 July 2015, Case C-88/14, Commission v Parliament and
Council ECLI:EU:C:2015:304, para. 45.
85See W.Q3 Voermans/J. Hartmann/M. Kaeding, 2014 TPL (2014) p. 5 at p. 9: ‘democratic
update’ of the implementing system.
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724These provisions prove that the European Parliament cannot with further ado
725deprive itself of its rule-making powers. Delegation of rule-making is subject to
726procedural and substantive safeguards which amount to a parliamentary
727reservation. Article 290 TFEU implies a constitutional requirement to adopt a
728specific legislative act, with controlling powers for the delegator.
729Admittedly, such safeguards for the European Parliament’s legislative and
730control competences are not explicitly provided for by EU primary law with regard
731to conferring decision-making powers to treaty bodies. A comparative
732constitutionalist justification for this might refer to the peculiarity of external
733relations as a traditional domain of the executive. The position of the executive in
734this policy area is historically fundamentally stronger than that of parliaments.86
735Consequently, safeguards for democratic legitimacy are commonly held not to be
736required to the same extent as in the case of domestic internal decision-making,
737regulation or legislation. Lower standards with regard to legitimacy requirements
738are therefore thought to be acceptable, at least as far as decision-making involving
739technical aspects, regulation of details and administrative functions is concerned.
740The traditional predominance of the executive in foreign affairs, however, can no
741longer be justifiably claimed after the strengthening of the position of the
742European Parliament in external relations by Lisbon, specifically in the area of
743trade policy. As shown in the previous section, the European Parliament now also
744has a strong political role in the negotiation and conclusion of trade agreements,
745making it almost the equal of the Council in this respect.
746The Meroni case law confirms the existence of inherent limitations to the
747delegation of powers that are a feature of the institutional balance within the EU
748and hence to democratic requirements, even though Meroni itself does not
749explicitly refer to democratic legitimacy. Institutional balance is an EU-specific
750form of the separation of powers brought about by the limited distribution of
751responsibilities to the EU institution concerned, resulting in a specific assignment
752of public functions under EU primary law (see Article 13(2) TEU). This implies a
753reciprocal obligation for each of the EU institutions to respect the competences of
754the other and the boundaries of its own competences,87 and comprises demands
755for the democratic legitimation of the exercise of public power.88 In Meroni, the
756European Court of Justice spelled out the limitations on the delegation of
757authority based on the principle of institutional balance (initially ‘balance of
758power’) with regard to the transfer of decision-making powers to institutions
86This position is based on J. Locke, Two Treatises of Government. Second Treatise, Chapter XII,
para. 146 ff.
87See recently in the context of external relations European Commission v Council, supra n. 45,
para. 40.
88See P. Craig, ‘Institutions, Power, and Institutional Balance’, in P. Craig and G. de Búrca (eds.),
The Evolution of EU Law, 2nd edn (Oxford University Press 2011) p. 41 ff.
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759outside EU primary law which restrain the freedom of EU organs to delegate
760discretionary powers.89 The guiding principles of Meroni are still pertinent when
761assessing the powers of EU institutions as the European Court of Justice applied
762them to delegation of the power to amend legislative acts90 (which now follows
763from Article 290 TFEU) and recently with regard to the delegation of regulatory
764powers to agencies.91
765The first stipulation of Meroni requires that a transfer of power be limited to
766‘clearly defined executive powers’,92 the exercise of which must be carried out
767under strict observance of objective criteria determined by the delegating
768authority, without granting a wide margin of discretion.93 Use of the powers has
769to be supervised by the delegating authority (cf the parallels with control
770mechanisms in Article 290(2)). The delegated powers must therefore be exercised
771within a precise, detailed regulatory framework of delegation. Second, delegation
772must not ‘bring about an actual transfer of responsibility’, which would be the case
773if the delegatee enjoyed such a degree of latitude that it actually exercised a political
774function that EU primary law had allocated to an EU institution. Hence, a transfer
775of power must not conflict with the division of powers provided for by the TEU/
776TFEU.
777One might object that the Meroni principles have not, strictly speaking, been
778formulated with regard to treaty bodies. Indeed, there are considerable differences
779that speak against their transferability in the present context. Treaty bodies are not
780administrative institutions within the internal market, and they are furthermore
781foreseen in primary EU law (i.e. Article 218(9)). Nevertheless, these principles also
782appear to be relevant for the delegation to treaty bodies.94 If the delegation of
783power within the EU is subject to constraints, these constraints would appear to be
784even more necessary when conferring powers to institutions created under
785international law that owe no democratic accountability to any EU institution.
89ECJ 13 June 1958, Case 9/56, Meroni v Haute autorité ECLI:EU:C:1958:7.
90ECJ 12 July 2005, Joined Cases C-154/04 and 155/04, Alliance for Natural Health and Others
ECLI:EU:C:2005:449, para. 90.
91ECJ 22 January 2014, Case C-270/12, United Kingdom v Parliament and Council ECLI:EU:
C:2014:18, para. 41 ff; P. Craig, EU Administrative Law (Oxford University Press 2012) p. 155.
92Meroni v Haute autorité , supra n. 89, [1958] ECR 133 at 152; Alliance for Natural Health and
Others, supra n. 90, para. 90.
93Discretionary powers are critical as soon as they imply a wide margin of discretion, see Meroni v
Haute autorité, supra n. 89, [1958] ECR 133 at 154; United Kingdom v Parliament and Council,
supra n. 91, para. 50. For this understanding see also Schütze, ‘“Delegated” legislation in the (new)
European Union: a Constitutional Analysis’, supra n. 79, p. 661 at p. 674, fn 89. For a criticism of a
distinguishability between wide and simple discretion see J. Saurer, ‘Supranational Governance and
Networked Accountability Structures: Member State Oversight of EU Agencies’, in S. Rose-
Ackerman et al. (eds.), Comparative Administrative Law, 2nd edn (2017) p. 619 at p. 627 ff.
94Accord von Bogdandy et al., supra n. 29, p. 130.
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786Articles 290 and 291 TFEU provide for the delegation of powers solely or mainly
787to the Commission, i.e. an EU institution that is ultimately accountable to the
788European Parliament, a circumstance that contributes to the democratic
789legitimacy of delegation under these rules.95 The fact that the binding decisions
790of treaty bodies are not directly applicable, meaning that they require
791implementation by the European Parliament or national parliaments, is no
792compensation for the loss of democratic accountability; parliaments may be forced
793to implement them without any substantial leeway.
794Consequently, the Meroni requirements apply to the present constellation and
795run parallel to the stipulations provided in Article 290. The firstMeroni stipulation
796equates to the Article 290(1) requirement of precision in the description of the
797delegated authority. It requires the delegating EU organ to set out in precise terms
798which powers are being conferred to a treaty body. The secondMeroni stipulation
799requires respect for the allocation of responsibilities under EU primary law. This
800translates in the present context – i.e. making use of the simplified procedure
801under Article 218(9) to enter into international obligations – into respect for the
802functions of the European Parliament, which is reflected by the establishment of
803control mechanisms by Article 290(2). Use of the simplified procedure must
804neither undermine treaty-making or legislative functions nor interfere with the
805control competences of the European Parliament with regard to executive rule-
806making. There would be considerable tension with the functional assignments of
807power between Council and European Parliament identified above if the
808approximate equilibrium of power between them in internal legislation and
809external trade-treaty-making were undermined by extensive use of the simplified
810procedure under Article 218(9). This suggests that the powers of the treaty bodies
811should be limited to decisions of an administrative or executive nature that serve to
812concretise the terms of an agreement. This would conform to the European Court
813of Justice’s description of the functions of the treaty bodies already cited above:
814‘applying or implementing that agreement’.
815If the treaty bodies, however, were able to adopt rules of general application
816that obligated the European Parliament (or the Commission by virtue of a
817mandate under Article 290) to amend secondary EU legislation accordingly –
818without the European Parliament having had the opportunity to pre-programme
819and control their content – the treaty bodies would then in effect be exercising
820regulatory or even legislative functions; the division of functions between the
821Council and the European Parliament would then be infringed upon. Therefore,
822the lack of involvement of the European Parliament in the Council decision-
823making on EU positions to be adopted in treaty bodies, and the lack of European
95Opinion of A.G. Jääskinen in ECJ 22 January 2014, Case C-270/12, United Kingdom v
Parliament and Council ECLI:EU:C:2013:562, para. 85.
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824Parliament control over the treaty bodies and the Council, militates in favour of
825limiting the scope of powers conferrable in this way to those that suit the type of
826public power attributed to the Council and that do not undermine the European
827Parliament’s functions.
828The fundamental principle of legislative reservation – according to which
829important, essential elements of policy remain exclusively with the legislature –
830also applies to external relations, as is confirmed by Article 218(9) TFEU. Article
831218(9) expressly provides that its simplified decision-making procedure on
832decisions of treaty bodies does not apply to the acts of treaty bodies that
833‘supplement or amend the institutional framework of the agreement’. Application
834of the simplified procedure is ruled out for institutional changes to an agreement,
835which are instead subject to the ordinary treaty making procedure.96 In the case of
836trade agreements or agreements establishing cooperation procedures, the ordinary
837treaty making procedure requires the consent of the European Parliament
838pursuant to Article 218(6) TFEU. Consequently, the exception in effect places
839limitations on which powers are conferrable on treaty bodies. Treaty bodies are
840not permitted to amend the institutional structure by way of establishing new
841treaty institutions or by changing the competences of the envisaged institutions.97
842Requiring that the ordinary treaty-making procedure be used for the adoption
843of institutional change safeguards the prerogatives of the European Parliament and
844the institutional balance in the EU.98 This exception appears to be motivated by
845an intent to exempt ‘particularly important decisions’99 from the scope of
846simplified procedures; these should apply only to ‘minor and quite technical
847amendments’.100 Hence, the exception in Article 218(9) excludes fundamental101
848changes from simplified procedures and thus reflects the exclusion of important,
849essential decisions from delegation to executive institutions, as under Article 290
850TFEU, also with regard to external relations. Consequently, ‘particularly
851important decisions’ cannot be the subject of a mandate to treaty bodies. Since
852the exception serves to safeguard the competences of the European Parliament, it
853should be conceived broadly rather than narrowly so that the determination of
854amendments to the institutional framework of an agreement can be informed by
855the meaning of ‘essential elements’ expressed in Article 290 TFEU. Accordingly,
856rule-making on fundamental issues must not be conferred to treaty bodies at all as
96See Opinion of A.G. Cruz Villalon in Germany v Council, supra n. 46, para. 75.
97SeeK. Schmalenbach, ‘Art. 218’ in C. Calliess andM. Ruffert (eds.), EUV/AEUV, 5th edn (CH
Beck 2016) para. 31.
98Opinion of A.G. Cruz Villalon in Germany v Council, supra n. 46, para. 80 ff.
99Opinion of A.G. Cruz Villalon in Germany v Council, supra n. 46, para. 75.
100Opinion of A.G. Szpunar, supra n. 22, para. 58, fn. 30
101See P.J. Kuijper et al., The Law of EU External Relations, 2nd edn (Oxford University Press
2015) p. 182.
28 Wolfgang Weiß EuConst 00 (2018)
857this is part of the joint treaty-making or legislative function reserved for the
858European Parliament and the Council.
859Identifying an EU (non-)delegation doctrine and consequences for CETA
860The above deliberations demonstrate that democracy and institutional balance
861concerns are the underlying cause for the explicit limitations to delegation
862enshrined in Articles 290 and 291 TFEU, the Meroni principles and Article 218
863(9) TFEU. The limitations apply both to internal and external decision-making,
864i.e. decision-making at the international level by virtue of authority delegated by
865the EU to international bodies; these rules and principles, taken together in an
866overall assessment, lay the foundation for a general delegation doctrine in EU law.
867As the limitations to delegation are founded on constitutional principles of
868institutional balance and democracy, they are implicitly present in any conferral of
869power by the EU. This is not limited to external trade relations, as the parallelism
870of the European Parliament’s legislative and treaty-making powers and the
871symmetry of the Council’s and the European Parliament’s competences apply to
872all treaties that establish a ‘specific institutional framework’ (Article 218(6)(iii)).
873Democracy and institutional balance requirements result in consistent, common
874limitations to any delegation of powers: non-delegation of the essential,102 and
875apart from that, specificity of conferred powers, both of which advise against
876granting wide discretion to the delegatee. Accordingly, deciding on essential issues
877is not transferable to treaty bodies. Conferred powers, or even mere executive
878decision-making, must be circumscribed and determined precisely in the enabling
879act, i.e. the agreement. The scope of the powers and the criteria for exercising them
880must be set out in the enabling treaty provision with a certain degree of specificity.
881In addition, rule-making of general scope or decision-making powers that allow
882wide discretion cannot be conferred to treaty bodies without assurances for the
883competencies of the European Parliament such as control mechanisms that can
884ensure the legitimacy of the substantive content of the treaty-body decisions. In
885short, one can identify three principles of delegation that also prevail in external
886relations: the essential is not delegable but must be provided for by the treaty;
887mandates for autonomous, binding decision-making by treaty bodies must be
888specific; any exercise of power beyond simple implementation measures must be
889subject to control by the European Parliament.
890Applying these principles to the mandates extended to CETA committees
891yields the insight that the rule of Article 218(9) TFEU should not raise concerns if
892it is applied to the conferral of precisely delineated implementation powers to
102Schütze, supra n. 75, p. 396: ‘absolute limitation [following] from the constitutional frame’.
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893CETA committees – without broad discretion and limited to a mere
894concretisation function.
895Decisions of fundamental importance, however, cannot be the subject of
896conferrals of power under the procedure of Article 218(9) if the decision-making
897criteria have not been clearly set out in CETA and hence had not been specifically
898consented to by the European Parliament. Therefore, the competence of the
899CETA joint committee under Article 8.29 CETA to transfer investment
900protection to a multilateral investment court is not legitimate since CETA sets
901requirements for neither ethical standards nor for safeguards for the independence
902and impartiality of the members of the Court and the applicable procedures of that
903Court. The decision as such was fully granted to the committee without any
904parliamentary control and without determining its conditions.
905The explicit exclusion by Article 218(9) of institutional changes from the
906powers conferrable on treaty bodies means that Article 26.1.5(a), (g), (h) CETA –
907which empowers the CETA joint committee to amend the responsibilities of
908specialised committees, provide for new responsibilities or establish new
909specialised committees and bilateral dialogues in order to assist it103 – cannot be
910conferred under the simplified procedure. Such changes to CETA must be
911adopted by the EU by means of the ordinary treaty making procedure, which
912requires European Parliament approval; application of Article 218(9) TFEU
913would be an infringement of EU law.
914The same applies to certain of the rule-making competences of CETA
915committees. Article 21.7.5 CETA allows the provision of fundamental issues to a
916CETA committee by which the committee is empowered to establish the
917conditions and criteria for the exchange of product warnings, including
918specification of the information to be exchanged and the modalities of exchange.
919These rules must respect confidentiality and protect sensitive business and
920personal data; they could potentially interfere with fundamental rights. CETA,
921however, sets no standards insofar as, even though with regard to data protection,
922for example, Article 8(3) EU Charter of Fundamental Rights implies an obligation
923by which data must be retained within the EU to enable the requisite data
924protection control.104 Implementation of a committee decision under Article
92521.7.5 CETA might require changes to EU Directive 2001/95 on the
926Community rapid information system; the European Parliament would be
927bound in spite of not having participated in the committee decision enactment.
103Other agreements also establish that a treaty body may set up further committees and define
their tasks, see Art. 15.1.4 EU Korea Free Trade Agreement, OJ 2011 L 127, 6; Art. 31.3 EU
Norway Agreement, OJ 1973 L 171, 2; Art. 43 EU Interim Treaty with Bosnia and Hercegovina,
OJ 2008 L 169, 13; Art. 49 EU Mexico Free Trade Agreement, OJ 2000 L 276, 45.
104ECJ 8 April 2014, Case C-293/12, Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger and Others ECLI:EU:
C:2014:238, para. 68.
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928Autonomous rule-making mandates in Articles 8.28.7 and in Article 8.44.2
929and 3 b) CETA also raise concerns with regard to the above principles. Article
9308.28.7 allows for the enactment of procedural rules concerning certain
931administrative and organisational aspects of the functioning of the Appellate
932Tribunal. Under Article 8.28.7 g), the CETA joint committee is given broad
933leeway to set out ‘any other elements it determines to be necessary for the effective
934functioning of the Appellate Tribunal’. The content and substance of these rules
935are not pre-defined; it is up to the committee itself to determine which rules might
936be necessary. It consequently enjoys a very wide range of discretion. Likewise, the
937autonomous rule-making authority of the CETA committee on Services and
938Investments under Articles 8.44.2 and 8.44.3(b) CETA lacks specificity with
939regard to a code of conduct for Tribunal Members and with regard to dispute
940settlement and transparency rules. Due to a lack of any precise conditions for the
941exercise of these decision-making powers by committees combined with a lack of
942any effective parliamentary control over their usage, their degree of legitimacy
943would be insufficient to allow a conferral of power by the EU by means of the
944Article 218(9) TFEU procedure without the European Parliament being given a
945decisive say in the exercise of these mandates.
946Strengthening the democratic legitimacy of treaty bodies
947These observations establish the need for democratic safeguards for the benefit of
948the European Parliament.
949Limiting the scope of simplified procedures
950One way to safeguard the European Parliament’s legislative and control functions
951within the EU democratic order would be to make all rule-making by treaty bodies
952subject to the requirement of consent by the European Parliament. Such a consent
953requirement would automatically ensue if one were to apply the normal treaty
954making procedure of Article 218 TFEU to such treaty-body decisions instead of
955the simplified procedures provided by its paragraphs 7 and 9. Consequently, treaty
956bodies would not have autonomous binding decision-making competences as
957such. Instead, their decisions would require consent by the European Parliament
958in order to enter into force – even under international law. This remedy might not
959comport with the intentions of the parties in setting up treaty bodies and it would
960complicate procedures. In particular, if the decisions of a treaty body related to a
961policy for which the Member States still enjoyed a degree of competence,
962European Parliament consent alone would not suffice; the consent of the national
963parliaments might be required in addition.
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964As has been shown, democratic and institutional balance requirements do not
965demand such a comprehensive bar against all rule-making by treaty bodies. Only
966the ability to autonomously engage in general, abstract rule-making, hence quasi-
967legislative rule-making on essential elements of policy including considerable
968interferences with fundamental rights, is barred from being transferred to treaty
969bodies. The exercise of such public powers is reserved for parliaments and the
970simplified procedures must not apply. Beyond this, there are no constitutional
971demands to limit the scope of simplified procedures as long as other constitutional
972requirements, i.e. the specificity of the delegation and parliamentary control, have
973been met. Consequently, for rule-making or single-case decision-making that
974remains below the essential elements threshold, other ways of effectively
975safeguarding the European Parliament’s effective control powers (beyond
976information and debate) may suffice.
977Additional safeguards to the democratic legitimacy of simplified procedures
978The constitutionally grounded requirement of specificity (see above) demands that
979the scope of the transferred powers and the criteria for their exercise by the treaty
980bodies be determined and circumscribed precisely in the enabling treaty provision.
981Additionally, control mechanisms are required to enable the European
982Parliament’s effective oversight of the use of rule-making powers or powers
983granting wide discretion. The control powers of the European Parliament must be
984strengthened in order to direct the exercise of public powers by the treaty bodies,
985in particular if decisions by the treaty bodies could interfere with EU legislation.
986An additional benefit of increased involvement and control by the European
987Parliament is that such control powers over the treaty bodies’ decision-making
988may prevent too extensive a reading of their powers, or even self-empowerment.
989These mechanisms could conceivably function at two levels, the international
990and the domestic, internal EU levels, alternatively or cumulatively. At the
991international level, this would translate into involvement by the European
992Parliament in the autonomous decision-making of treaty bodies. One way of
993achieving this would be to regard Members of the European Parliament as part of
994the EU representation in the treaty bodies, or at least to grant them observer status.
995The current Framework Agreements foresee European Parliament Members as
996observers at international conferences, as part of the EU delegation.105 This
997possibility could be expanded to include observer status for the European
998Parliament in treaty bodies of EU Free Trade Agreements. In this way, the
999European Parliament would receive direct information regarding the processes
105See para. 25 ff Framework Agreement (fn. 62).
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1000within the treaty bodies, which would contribute to the effectiveness of the
1001European Parliament’s control over them.
1002At the domestic level, such mechanisms would require the involvement
1003of the European Parliament in the preparation of the EU position pursuant to
1004Article 218(9) TFEU. At the very least, this would entail making sure that the
1005European Parliament received complete and timely information at all stages
1006of the procedure (Article 218(10) TFEU) with regard to envisaged treaty-body
1007decisions. One could, for instance, allow the European Parliament to formulate
1008binding recommendations for the Commission in drafting proposals for Council
1009decisions pursuant to Article 218(9),106 or at least make the Commission subject
1010to an obligation to state its reasons for not taking the recommendations into
1011account.107 The full provision of information to the European Parliament by the
1012Commission before agreement modifications authorised by the Council under
1013Article 218(7) TFEU108 can be approved, must be expanded to include Article
1014281(9) TFEU.
1015Another, much more promising way of increasing control by the European
1016Parliament with regard to international rule-making in treaty bodies would be to
1017require formal European Parliament involvement in Council decision-making
1018pursuant to Article 218(9) TFEU. If a decision involved rule-making, in particular
1019if it required – for its implementation – any change to EU legislation, the
1020European Parliament would need to be granted a right of consent. The expansion
1021of the European Parliament’s rights brought about by the Lisbon Treaty has led to
1022considerable enhancement of its role in legislation, budgeting and treaty-making,
1023but the simplified procedure of Article 218(9) has not been amended to reflect this
1024change.109 If the European Parliament’s consent to the Council decisions were
1025required, this deficit would be corrected. This change would not require an
1026amendment to the EU Treaties; it could be implemented by the Council decision
1027on the conclusion of the EU Free Trade Agreement, in which a framework could
1028be established which prescribes the European Parliament’s involvement in the
1029procedures under Article 218(9). Alternatively, a Framework Agreement between
1030the Council and the European Parliament could establish a general requirement
1031for Council decisions under Article 218(9).
106Currently, Rule 108(4) Rules of Procedure of the EP, January 2017 <www.europarl.europa.
eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+RULES-EP+20170116+0+DOC+PDF+V0//
EN&language=EN> and para. 23 of the Framework Agreement only provide for EP
recommendations that are required to be taken into account with regard to the negotiation and
conclusion of agreements. Rule 109 (2) merely foresees that the EP may issue recommendations
which may include requests to the Council.
107See Annex III, para. 4 of the Framework Agreement.
108See Annex III, para. 9 of the Framework Agreement.
109Accord Alemanno, supra n. 9, p. 636 ff.
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1032Keeping legal certainty in mind, the more preferable solution would be to
1033adopt a general regulatory framework for the implementation of the treaty-body
1034decision-making provided in EU Agreements. A legislative regulation could be
1035enacted by virtue of Article 207(2) TFEU that provides the additional safeguards
1036proposed here.110
1037Conclusion
1038EU Free Trade Agreements establish treaty bodies upon which public powers of an
1039increasingly diverse and significant nature are conferred. The conferral of rule-
1040making functions in particular raises democratic concerns; the treaty bodies are
1041not subject to parliamentary control and the EU position is decided solely by the
1042Council acting under Article 218(9) TFEU. Under CETA, the use of treaty bodies
1043to amend and further develop the agreement in particular and trade relations with
1044Canada in general has reached a new level; it provides for a full array of committees
1045which enjoy autonomous decision-making powers. This paper therefore analyses
1046the question of whether these competences could potentially present a threat to
1047democracy. The decision-making powers of the CETA committees are – in most
1048cases – autonomous and binding on parties under both international and EU law.
1049Hence, the transfer of powers to the committees constitutes a conferral of public
1050powers by the EU to international institutions. Such a conferral of powers is
1051bound by the principle of conferral found in EU law. Under the EU Treaties, the
1052EU is competent to establish legally binding decision-making treaty bodies. There
1053are, however, limitations which the EU must respect when empowering treaty
1054bodies. These derive from democratic legitimacy requirements and the
1055institutional balance between the European Parliament and Council, and result
1056in a non-delegation doctrine with regard to essential elements of policy, a
1057specificity requirement with regard to non-essential decision-making powers and a
1058need for effective control mechanisms for the benefit of the European Parliament
1059in case the delegation of rule-making or decision-making goes beyond simple
1060implementation measures, in particular if implying a wide degree of discretion.
1061The constitutional foundation for these requirements can be found in a
1062comprehensive synopsis of the requirements for delegation in Articles 290, 218
1063(9) TFEU and theMeroni case law. In consequence, limitations on the delegation
1064of internal and external EU rule-making are comparable for the sake of protecting
1065the prerogatives of the European Parliament where it shares treaty-making powers
1066with the Council. Applying these constraints to CETA committee mandates
110For a proposal of an EU Trade Act see T. Cottier, ‘Front Loading Trade Policy-Making in the
European Union: Towards a Trade Act’, European Yearbook of International Economic Law (2017)
p. 35. It should contain the rules proposed here.
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1067demonstrates that several of them are a cause of concern. Therefore, additional
1068safeguards that strengthen the European Parliament’s control powers have to be
1069implemented. Consequently, the role of the European Parliament in the
1070implementation phase of trade agreements that establish decision-making bodies
1071must be expanded considerably, as has been done regarding the role of the
1072European Parliament in the implementation of EU legislation internally.111
1073
1074
111See P. Craig, The Lisbon Treaty (Oxford University Press, 2010) p. 53 ff.
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